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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Plaintiff,
VS.
1
]

ADREN RAY WARNER,

CASE NO. 890226CA
PRIORITY NO.

Appellant/Defendant.

]

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

1.

JURISDICTION: Jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals is

conferred pursuant to U.C.A., section 78-2a-3(e).
2.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS;

This is an appeal from the

Defendant's conviction, pursuant to a hearing on a Motion to Suppress
the Evidence and bench trial before the Honorable J.Dennis Frederick
sitting in Summit County, Utah, for Possession of A Controlled
Substance (Methamphetamine) on violation of U.C.A., section
58-37-8(2)(a){i).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the Court Err by denying the Defendant's Motion to

Suppress.
2.

Did the Court Err by ruling that the warrantless

searches conducted by the UHP Trooper were constitutionally valid
searches.
3.
evidence.

Did the Court Err by allowing State's Exhibit No. 3 into

4.

Did the Court err

by finding Appellant guilty based upon

State's Exhibit No. 2 constituting an unusable and almost
undetectable amount of a controlled substance.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged in a single count information with
Possession of A Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine) in violation
of U.C.A., section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i).
The vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger was stopped by a
Utah Highway Patrol trooper for a routine speeding violation

(77 in a

65) on State Road 80, Echo Canyon, Summit County, Utah. (R 54, pg.
26, 1. 14-16)
The Trooper asked the driver of the vehicle for her driver's
license and registration. (R 54, pg. 26, 1. 17 to pg. 2 7 , 1. 3) While
the passenger

(Defendant) was looking through the glove box for the

vehicle owner's (Driver's) registration, the Trooper noticed a twelve
pack of beer under the passenger's seat. The Trooper went around to
the Passenger's side of the vehicle inspected the twelve pack of
beer, found it to be unopened, however, observed a "cold cup" between
the passenger's door and seat containing an open can of beer,
one-eighth full. (R 54, pg. 2 8 , 1. 23 to pg. 31, 1. 1)
asked the passenger

The Trooper

(Defendant) for his I.D. and Defendant gave the

Trooper his Wyoming driver's license.

The Trooper issued a speeding

citation to the driver of the vehicle and ran a warrant check on the
passenger

(Defendant). The warrant check revealed an outstanding

traffic warrant on the passenger (Defendant) out of Coalville. The
officer arrested the passenger

(Defendant) on the outstanding warrant

and transported the Defendant to the Summit County Jail. (R 54, pg.

33, 1. 23 to pg. 3 4 , 1. 23)

The driver of the vehicle was free to

go, however, she followed the Trooper to Coalville to await action on
her boyfriend

(Defendant).

While booking the Defendant into the Summit County Jail the
Trooper conducted a pat down search of the Defendant, felt something
hard in the Defendant's shirt pocket, and found this object to be a
small brown vial. The vial appeared to be empty, however, upon
further inspection of the vial by the trooper he noticed what
appeared to be minute white powder flakes on the upper edge of the
vial. (R 54, pg. 3 8 , 1. 11 to pg. 39, 1. 15 and pg. 4 0 , 1. 3 to pg.
4 2 , 1. 7)

Based upon his experience as a police officer, and without

conducting any field tests, the Trooper felt that these white powdery
flakes was contraband. (R 54, pg. 4 2 , 1. 5-12)
After the Defendant was booked into the Summit County Jail, the
Trooper then went outside of the jail complex to the vehicle in which
the Defendant was traveling. The Trooper approached the driver/owner
of the vehicle, Vicky Courtney, told her that he found a vial on the
Defendant, believed it contained cocaine, and was going to search Ms.
Courtney. The Trooper then conducted a full blown search of Ms.
Courtney and her purse outside of her vehicle in the Courthouse
parking

lot. The Trooper found nothing. The Trooper then proceeded to

conduct a full blown search of Ms. Courtney's vehicle without asking
for her permission. The Trooper found nothing. (R 54, pg. 43, 1. 3 to
pg. 4 8 , 1. 12) After the search of the vehicle the Trooper then began
searching the pockets of a jacket in Ms. Courtney's vehicle and found
a small yellow scraper with a folded piece of paper tucked into the
protective shield. The Trooper asked whose jacket it was and Ms.
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Courtney identified the jacket as belonging to the Defendant, (R 54,
pg. 48, 1. 13 to pg. 52, 1. 1) The Trooper took the yellow scraper up
to the jail along with the coat it was found in and asked the
Defendant if it was his jacket. The Defendant identified the jacket
as his but when confronted with the yellow scraper denied having
knowledge as to where the scraper came from. The Trooper then opened
the paper bindle in front of the Defendant and found it to contain a
small quantity of a white powdery substance. Upon his belief that the
owdery substance contained contraband the Defendant was charged with
P:_

.vission of a Controlled Substance. (R 54, pg. 52, 1. 2 to pg. 54,

1 . 6)
The Defendant was bound over for trial at the conclusion of his
Preliminary Hearing. The Defendant made a Motion to Suppress the
Evidence and on March 20, 1989, before Judge J. Dennis Frederick, a
combined suppression hearing and bench trial was conducted. (R 54,
pg. 4, 1. 15 to pg. 5, 1. 19)

At the conclusion of the hearing/trial

the Motion to Suppress was denied and Defendant was found guilty. (R
54, pg. 103, 1. 18 to pg. 108, 1. 12 and pg. 124, 1. 17 to pg. 125,
1. 11) It is from the Court's denial of the Motion to Suppress and
Guilty Verdict that Defendant now appeals.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Were the law enforcement officer's warrantless, post arrest

search of the vehicle a constitutionally valid search under the
provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions.
2.

Was the amount of controlled substance found on State's

Exhibit No.

2

an insufficient amount to substantiate a conviction

for "Possession of a Controlled Substance".

/. _

ARGUMENTS

POINT I
THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER'S WARRANTLESS, POST ARREST SEARCH OF THE
VEHICLE, AND ITS CONTENTS, WAS NOT A CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID SEARCH

Appellant primarily relies on the Utah case of STATE v.
CHRISTENSEN, 676 P2d 408 (Utah, 1984) wherein, at page 411, the Court
stated:
"The validity of the arrest in this case does not determine
whether the evidence was lawfully obtained. Rather, the issue is the
constitutionality of the manner by which the evidence was obtained,
irrespective of the legality of the arrest."
Appellant submits that the CHRISTENSEN case

frames the primary

issue in this present appeal, to wit: The constitutionality of the
manner by which the evidence was obtained.
The Highway Patrol Trooper in this case conducted

several

warrantless searches after Appellant's arrest: a full blown search of
the driver's purse as we?ll as a pat down search of the driver; a full
blown search of the vehicle in which the Appellant was traveling,
and; a full blown search of a jacket in the vehicle which belonged to
the Appellant. (R 54, pg. 43, 1. 3 to pg. 52, 1. 1 ) .

Thus we must

look at these searches in light of the general guidelines set down in
the

CHRISTENSEN

case.

The Court in the CHRISTENSEN case affirmed the position that
"Warrantless searches and seizures are

per se unreasonable unless

exigent circumstances require action before a warrant can be
obtained."

(at pg. 411, further citing ROBBINS v. CALIFORNIA, 453

U.S. 420, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 69 L.Ed.2d 744 [1981], KATZ v. UNITED
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STATES, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d

576 [1967], STATE v.

ROMERO, 660 P2d 715 [Utah, 1983], STATE v. LEE, 633 P2d 48 [Utah,
1983])
Appellant contends that the only grounds upon which the searches
could be held valid are if it is found that: 1) the searches were
incident to a valid arrest, or;

2) exigent circumstances existed.

Appellant asserts that the searches were not incident to a valid
arrest.

The facts in this case indicate that the Appellant, a

passenger in the vehicle, was arrested on State Road 8 0 , Echo Canyon,
Summit County, Utah (R 54, pg. 26, 1. 14-16), after the Trooper
stopped the driver of the vehicle, Appellant's girlfriend, ran a
warrants check on the Appellant and found an outstanding warrant on
the Appellant for a traffic violation.

The Appellant was then taken

in the Trooper's vehicle to Coalville and booked into jail.

The

driver of the vehicle was not detained at the scene of Appellant's
arrest, nor was the vehicle impounded, however, the driver of the
vehicle chose to follow the Trooper to Coalville to await the outcome
of her boyfriend, Appellant. (R 54, pg. 33, 1. 23 to pg. 3 4 , 1. 2 3 ) .
It was not until after the Appellant was booked into the jail,
subjected to an inventory search and a "suspicious looking" vial
found on Appellant's person by the Trooper that the Trooper decided
to conduct his three searches.

Under these facts, Appellant asserts

that the searches could not have been incident to the Appellant's
arrest as the Courts have generally held that a delayed search of a
car

cannot be upheld as incident to an arrest. (CHAMBERS V. MARONEY,

399 U.S. 4 2 , 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 [1970]; PRESTON v. U.S.,
376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 [1964])
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Disposing of this issue, we must now glean the facts to
determine if any exigent circumstances existed at the time of the
searches.

However, prior to determining whether exigent

circumstances existed, sufficient to excuse the constitutional
necessity of a search warrant, a threshold issue must be dealt with:
did the Trooper have Probable Cause - probable cause upon which a
search warrant could have been issued- This concept is generally
known as the CARROLL-CHAMBERS DOCTRINE which incorporates the
guidelines espoused in the cases of CARROLL v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 45
S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 [1925] and CHAMBERS V. MAROINEY, 399 U.S. 4 2 ,
90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 [1970].
When police may proceed to search the vehicle without first
obtaining a warrant, it would appear that only the procedure of
obtaining a search warrant is being excused; there must still be
grounds upon which a search warrant could have been issued. As the
court put it in CHAMBERS, it is still essential that there be
"circumstances which furnish probable cause to search a particular
auto for particular articles."
As the facts in this case would indicate, the Trooper had no
probable cause to believe that the vehicle, driver of the vehicle
the jacket in the vehicle contained contraband.

or

In support of this

assertion we must look at what facts the Trooper had before him upon
which he could have formed a probable cause:
i.

All the Trooper found pursuant to the inventory search of

the Appellant was a seemingly empty, small, dark brown vial with a
minuscule amount of white crusting on the lip of the jar. (State's
Exhibit No. 2 ) . (R 54, pg. 65, 1. 6 to pg. 6 8 , 1. 7) The amount of
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white substance found by the Trooper was so insignificant that the
State's Toxicology expert initially did not test the substance and
thought the brown vial was empty.(R 54, pg. 6 2 , 1. 8-17 and pg. 65,
1. 6 to pg. 6 8 , 1. 7)
2.

At the scene of the initial traffic stop the Trooper had

ample opportunity to visually examine the interior of the vehicle as
well as the contents of the glovebox and had no probable cause to
suspect that the vehicle contained contraband. (R 54, pg. 37, 1. 17
to pg. 3 8 , 1. 10)
3.

After the Trooper conducted two of the illegal searches, the

search of the automobile and the search of the driver's purse, the
Trooper still found no contraband nor any evidence of contraband. (R
54, pg. 45, 1. 2 to pg. 48, 1. 12)
4.

Prior to the Trooper beginning his third illegal search,

into the pockets of Appellant's jacket in the car, the jacket itself
and its weight failed to raise any suspicion. (R 54, pg. 48, 1. 13-23
and pg. 49, 1. 1-18)
It was at this point in time that the Trooper went into the
pockets of the jacket and found State's Exhibit No. 3 (the scraper
with the paper bindle tucked behind i t ) .

Up to this point in time

the Trooper had absolutely no probable cause to believe that the
vehicle, its contents, and/or its occupants had any contraband. It is
Appellant's contention that the searches conducted by the Trooper was
merely unconstitutional searches amounting to nothing more than a
fishing expedition which lead to the unconstitutional seizure of what
was later introduced into evidence against the Appellant as State's
Exhibit No. 3 (the scraper with the paper bindle tucked behind i t ) .

For arguments sake, if the Trooper was deemed to have had
sufficient probable causae, we must now determine whether or not there
were sufficient exigent circumstances present to excuse the
constitutional

requirement and procedure of obtaining a search

warrant.
It is the Appellant's contention that the Trooper had ample time
to obtain a search warrant for the vehicle if he had probable cause
to believe that the vehicle, its contents and/or the driver were
concealing contraband. In reaching this conclusion, Appellant points
to the following facts:
1.

The vehicle was voluntarily driven to the Summit County Jail

by the Appellant's girlfriend who was patiently waiting for the
Appellant to go through the booking process.
2.

The Summit County Jail is located in the Summit County

Courthouse, in Coalville, Utah and shares the same premises with the
Courts and a Highway Patrol Headquarters.
3.

The Trooper could have, prior to conducting the searches,

impounded or detained the vehicle and readily obtained a search
warrant from the Coalville Justice of the Peace. As the Court in the
CARROLL case stated, in "cases where the securing of a warrant is
reasonable practicable, it must be used."
4.

The vehicle was parked, immobile, and unoccupied thus not

giving rise to exigent circumstances-

(STATE v. KOCK, 725 P2d 1285

[Ore., 1985]).
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POINT II
THE AMOUNT OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOUND ON STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 2 IS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUBSTANTIATE A CONVICTION FOR "POSSESSION OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE"

From the facts of this case it is undisputed that all the
Trooper found pursuant to the inventory search of the Appellant was a
seemingly empty, small, dark brown vial with a minuscule amount of
white crusting on the lip of the jar. (State's Exhibit No. 2 ) . (R 54,
pg. 65, 1. 6 to pg. 6 8 , 1. 7) The amount of white substance found by
the Trooper was so insignificant that the State s Toxicology expert
initially did not test the substance and thought the brown vial was
empty.(R 54, pg. 6 2 , 1. 8-17 and pg. 65, 1. 6 to pg. 6 8 , 1. 7)
Further, the State s Toxicology expert testified that the quantity of
methamphetamine found on the brown vial amounted to residue - an
insufficient amount to cause any physical effect on an individual. (R
54, pg. 6 7 , 1. 6 to pg. 6 8 , 1. 7 and pg. 69, 1. 15-18)
U.C.A., section 58-37-2(27), which defines the term "Possession"
makes no reference to quantity.

Likewise, the statute under which

Appellant was charged, U.C.A., section 58-37-8(2)(a)(l), makes no
reference to quantity.

In light of the absence of any statutory

reference to quantity and the minuscule amount of methamphetamine
found on the brown vial

(State's Exhibit No. 2) amounting to nothing

more than residue - an insufficient amount to cause any physical
effect on an individual, State s Exhibit No. 2 and the
methamphetamine found thereon are insufficient to uphold Appellant s
conviction under U.C.A., section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). (PEOPLE v. LEAL,

413 P2d 665 [Cal., 1966]; PEOPLE v. JOHNSON, 85 Cal. Rptr. 238 [Cal.,
1970]; BEUTLER v. STATE, 504 P2d 699 [Nev., 1972]
CONCLUSION
Appellant urges the Court to determine that: 1) As to State's
Exhibit No. 1, the amount of m e t h a m p h e t a m m e found thereon, amounting
to useless traces, does not constitute a criminal act within the
meaning of U.C.A., section 58-37-2(27) and U.C.A., section
58-37-8(2)(a)(l), and; ?) That the post arrest warrantless searches
of the vehicle and its contents and occupants constitute
constitutionally

illegal searches and seizures requiring suppress of

State s Exhibit No. 3.
For the foregoing arguments, Defendant/Appellant requests that
this Court:
1.

Reverse his conviction by the trial court;

2.

For such further relief as the Court deems appropriate under

the circumstances.
Dated this 21st day of July, 1989.

^X
Attorney
pellant
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ADDENDUM
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58-37-2

OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS

(c) articles, other than food, intended to
affect the structure or function of man or
other animals; and
(d) articles intended for use as a component of any articles specified in Subsection
(a), (b), or (c); but does not include devices or
their components, parts, or accessories.
(14) "Drug dependent person" means any individual who unlawfully and habitually uses any
controlled substance to endanger the public
morals, health, safety, or welfare, or who is so
dependent upon the use of controlled substances
as to have lost the power of self-control with reference to his dependency.
(15) "Food" means:
(a) any nutrient or substance of plant,
mineral, or animal origin other than a drug
as specified in this chapter, and normally ingested by human beings; and
(b) foods for special dietary uses as exist
by reason of a physical, physiological, pathological, or other condition including but not
limited to the conditions of disease, convalescence, pregnancy, lactation, allergy, hypersensitivity to food, underweight, and overweight; uses for supplying a particular dietary feeed which exist by reason of age including but not limited to the ages of infancy
and childbirth, and also uses for supplementing and for fortifying the ordinary or unusual diet with any vitamin, mineral, or
other dietary property for use of a food. Any
particular use of a food is a special dietary
use regardless of the nutritional purposes.
(16) "Immediate precursor" means a substance
which the Attorney General of the United States
has found to be, and by regulation designated as
being, the principal compound used or produced
primarily for use in the manufacture of a controlled substance, or which is an immediate
chemical intermediary used or likely to be used
in the manufacture of a controlled substance, the
control of which is necessary to prevent, cur>iffl,
or limit the manufacture of the controJJ^tf substance.
(17) "Manufacture" means the production,
preparation, propagation, compounding, or processing of a controlled substaifev either directly
or indirectly by extraction from substances of
natural origin, or independently by means of
chemical synthesis or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis.
(18) "Manufacturer" includes any person who
packages, repackages, or labels any container of
any controlled substance, except pharmacists
who dispense or compound prescription orders for
delivery to the ultimate consumer.
(19) "Marihuana" means all parts of the plant
cannabis sativa L. whether growing or not; the
seeds of it; the resin extracted from any part of
the plant; and every compound, manufacture,
salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the
plant, its seeds, or resin. The term does not include the mature stalks of the plant, fiber produced from the stalks, oil or cake made from the
seeds of the plant, any other compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of
the mature stalks, except the resin extracted
from them, fiber, oil or cake, or the sterilized seed
of the plant which is incapable of germination.
Any synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in the plant cannabis sativa which are

68

chemically indistinguishable and pharmacologically active are also included.
(20) "Money" means officially issued coin and
currency of the United States or any foreign
country.
(21) "Narcotic drug" means any of the following, whether produced directly or indirectly by
extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or
independently by means of chemical synthesis, or
by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis:
(a) opium, coca leaves, and opiates;
(b) a compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, or preparation of opium, coca leaves, or
opiates;
(c) opium poppy and poppy straw; or
(d) a substance, and any compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, or preparation of
the substance, which is chemically identical
with any of the substances referred to in
Subsections (a), (b), or (c), except narcotic
drug does not include decocainized coca
leaves or extracts of coca leaves which do not
contain cocaine or ecgonine.
(22) "Negotiable instrument" means documents, containing an unconditional promise to
pay a sum of money, which are legally transferable to another party by endorsement or delivery.
(23) "Opiate" means any drug or other substance having an addiction-forming or addictionsustaining liability similar to morphine or being
capable of conversion into a drug having addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability.
(24) "Opium poppy" means the plant of the
species papaver somniferum L., except the seeds
of the plant.
(25) "Person" means any corporation, association, partnership, trust, other institution or entity or one or more individuals.
(26) "Poppy straw" means all parts, except the
seeds, of the opium poppy, after mowing.
(27) "Possession" or "use" means the joint or
individual ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, obtaining, or the application, inhalation, swallowing,
injection, or consumption, as distinguished from
distribution, of controlled substances and includes individual, joint, or group possession or
use of controlled substances. For a person to be a
possessor or user of a controlled substance, it is
not required that he be shown to have individually possessed, used, or controlled the substance,
but it is sufficient if it is shown that he jointly
participated with one or more persons in the use,
possession, or control of any substances with
knowledge that the activity was occurring.
(28) "Practitioner" means a physician, dentist,
veterinarian, pharmacist, scientific investigator,
pharmacy, hospital, or other person licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to, administer, or use in teaching or chemical analysis a controlled substance in the course of professional
practice or research in this state.
(29) "Proceeds" means whatever is received
when an object is sold, exchanged, or otherwise
disposed of.
(30) "Production" means the manufacture,
planting, cultivation, growing, or harvesting of a
controlled substance.
(31) "Securities" means any stocks, bonds,
notes, or other evidences of debt or of property.

OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS
(m) filled and dispensed by a pharmacist
practicing his profession within the physical
structure of the hospital, or the order is
taken from a supply lawfully maintained by
the hospital and the amount taken from the
supply is administered directly to the patient
authorized to receive it
(8) No information communicated to any licensed
actitioner in an attempt to unlawfully procure or
procure the administration of, a controlled sub
ance is considered to be a privileged communica
>n

(-37-7. Labeling and packaging
substance.

1967

controlled

(1) No person licensed pursuant to this act shall
stribute a controlled substance unless it is packfed and labeled in compliance with the requireente of § 305 of the Federal Comprehensive Drug
buse Prevention and Control Act of 1970
(2) No person except a pharmacist for the purpose
filling a prescription shall alter, deface, or remove
ly label affixed by the manufacturer
(3) Whenever a pharmacist sells or dispenses any
mtrolled substance on a prescription issued by a
ractitioner, he shall affix to the container in which
le substantia is sold or dispensed a label showing his
wn name, address, and registry number, or the
ame, address, and registry number of the pharma
tst or pharmacy owner for whom he is lawfully actig, the prescription number, the name of the patient,
r if the patient is an animal, the name of the owner
f the animal and the species of the animal, the name
f the practitioner by whom the prescription was
mtten, any directions stated on the prescription and
ny directions required by rules and regulations prolulgated by the department
No person shall alter the face or remove any label
o long as any of the original^ contents remain
(4) An individual to whom or for whose use any
on trolled substance has been prescribed, sold, or dispensed by a practitioner and the owner of any animal
or which any substance has been prescnbed^ssfa, or
iispensed by a vetennanan may lawfullv^i^Vssess it
nly in the container in which it was delivered to him
>y the person selling or dispensing it
1966
•8-37-8. Prohibited acts — p e n a l t i e s .
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is
unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or
to possess with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit
substance,
(n) distnbute a controlled or counterfeit
substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance,
(in) possess a controlled substance in the
course of his business as a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances listed in Schedules II through V except under an order or prescription,
dv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distnbute
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsec
tion (1) (a) with respect to
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or
II is euiltv of a second degree felony and
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Subsection (lKa) is guilty of a first degree
felony,
(n) a substance classified in Schedule HI
or IV, or manhuana, is guilty of a third de
gree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction punishable under this subsection
is guilty of a second degree felony, or
(m) a substance classified in Schedule V is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a
second or subsequent conviction punishable
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties
(a) It is unlawful
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid
prescnption or order or directly from a prac
titioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or as otherwise authonzed
by this subsection,
(n) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tene
ment, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place,
knowingly and intentionally to permit them
to be occupied by persons unlawfully possess
ing, using, or distnbutmg controlled sub
stances in any of those locations,
(m) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation of this chapter and the use or possession
is open, obvious, apparent, and not concealed
from those present, however, a person may
not be convicted under this subsection if the
evidence shows that he did not use the substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist
anyone else to do so, any incidence of prior
unlawful use of controlled substances by the
defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense,
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged prescription or wntten order for a controlled
substance,
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this
chapter knowingly and intentionally to prescnbe, administer, or dispense a controlled
substance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in Section 78-14-5
of a parent, guardian, or person standing in
loco parentis of the juvenile except in cases
of an emergency, for purposes of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in
Subsection 78-3a-2(3), and "emergency"
means any physical condition requmng the
administration of a controlled substance for
immediate relief of pain or suffenng,
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this
chapter knowingly and intentionally to pre8cnbe or administer dosages of a controlled
substance in excess of medically recognized
quantities necessary to treat the ailment,
malady, or condition of the ultimate user, or
(vn) for any person to prescnbe, administer, or dispense any controlled substance to
another person knowing that the other person is using a false name, address, or other
personal information for the purpose of secunng the same
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsec
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